Midway and the Missing Blunder

The Battle of Midway has been extensively studied, analyzed, and written about, but all of the studies have missed the point that the Japanese Navy would have defeated the U.S. Navy if not for an inexcusable blunder of Admiral Yamamota. Without Yamamota's folly, history would have recorded the destruction of the America's Pacific Fleet and Admiral Nimitz would possibly have been relieved of duty in disgrace.

Even with its code-breaking intelligence and its position at Point Luck, the U.S. Navy would have had the remainder of its Pacific Fleet destroyed in the battle had Yamamota not suffered from "winner's disease" and tried to repeat what worked so well at Pearl Harbor.

Much has been made of the dilemma that Admiral Nagumo had upon hearing that there were enemy ships within battle range. Nagumo had bombers returning from the attack on Midway that desperately needed to be landed and refueled and he had bombers loaded with land-based ordinance, requiring reloading with armor piercing (anti-ship) ordinance upon being informed of the American fleet. His need to make difficult decisions, his need to land incoming planes, and his need to change ordinance, all cost valuable time before he could get his planes in the air. He had a real dilemma but it was a dilemma that was totally unnecessary -- all of his bombers should have been armed and fueled and waiting for the American carriers. Their sole mission should have been to attack American carriers. All of his pilots should have been well rested and ready for battle at a moment's notice.

The attack on Midway, assumed necessary to draw out the American ships into harm's way, should have been made by Yamamota's battleships. The battleships were capable of putting an order of magnitude more ordinance upon the small islands than the carrier planes of Nagumo's. They would need the air support of Yamamota's carriers, but that air support, made up entirely of the defensive Zero fighters of only one carrier, would have been more than sufficient to destroy the Midway air force.

Nagumo's force to attack the American fleet would have included four carriers (the one flat-top sent to Alaska was a waste). Nagumo would have had nearly 300 planes, dive-bombers, torpedo planes, and Zero escort fighters to attack the American fleet. And, more importantly, they would have been prepared to attack upon first realizing the presence of American ships. Nagumo's planes were superior to the outdated American planes and his pilots were more experienced and, at that time, better trained. Attacking the American carriers would have been like “shooting fish in a barrel.”

Above all, the point should be made, that, by all accounts, the real target was the American carriers, and not Midway, a small atoll of no strategic value to the Japanese. Since the attack on Midway was just the bait, battleships would have sufficed, and Nagumo's real target would have been easy prey for his deadly planes.

Yamamota's great success at Pearl Harbor was an air attack, and, suffering from "repeat your success" intoxication, he wasted his planes doing what his battleships could have done much better.